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Abstract. The rapid digital transformation without security considera-
tions has resulted in the rise of global-scale cyberattacks. The first line of
defense against these attacks are Network Intrusion Detection Systems
(NIDS). Once deployed, however, these systems work as blackboxes with
a high rate of false positives with no measurable effectiveness. There
is a need to continuously test and improve these systems by emulating
real-world network attack mutations. We present SynGAN, a framework
that generates adversarial network attacks using the Generative Adver-
sial Networks (GAN). SynGAN generates malicious packet flow muta-
tions using real attack traffic, which can improve NIDS attack detection
rates. As a first step, we compare two public datasets, NSL-KDD and CI-
CIDS2017, for generating synthetic Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
network attacks. We evaluate the attack quality (real vs. synthetic) using
a gradient boosting classifier.
Keywords: Intrusion Detection Systems · Unsupervised Packet Gener-
ation · GAN · GP-WGAN
1 Introduction
Advancements in Machine Learning (ML) methods have given malicious actors
new cyber-offense tools, resulting in high-volume and complex attacks. The first
line of defense against these attacks are Network Intrusion Detection System
(NIDS) that can learn network activity patterns by monitoring traffic, and raise
an alarm when malicious traffic is encountered. These systems typically rely on
both static attack signatures and dynamic behavior learning methods using data
and time variations. These detection methods can be potentially evaded by at-
tack mutations and complex learning algorithms [1]. They can also have high
rates of false positives with no measurable effectiveness [2,3]. There is a need to
continuously test, improve, and evolve NIDS models using real-world network
? Part of this work was done at the Internet Real-Time Lab at Columbia University.
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attack mutations that can enhance both accuracy and complexity of attack pat-
tern detection. Deep Learning Neural Networks [4] have been previously applied
to improve NIDS [5] systems. The most recent Gradient Penalty-Wasserstein
Generative Adversial Networks (GP-WGAN) [6] can address both complexity
and high-quality of synthetic network traffic flow generation [7].
In this work, in contrast to [7], we apply the GP-WGAN algorithm to specifi-
cally generate synthetic network attacks, using publicly available datasets. We
present the SynGAN framework consisting of three components: the Generator,
the Discriminator and the Evaluator, as shown in figure 1. The generated pack-
ets are measured against a quality benchmark, defined by the similarity between
generated “synthetic” packets and real packets. We compare two real-world net-
work datasets NSL-KDD [8] and CICIDS2017 [9] for synthetic network attack
generation. Although NSL-KDD is a well-known network security dataset, it has
short-comings in evaluating NIDS [10]. For our initial framework development
and evaluation, however, the NSL-KDD dataset provides a good starting refer-
ence point. We evaluate the framework against the Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) family of attacks that can have complex time variations.
In section 2, we describe the methodology including theoretical background of
GP-WGANs, the DDoS taxonomy, and the SynGAN framework. In section 3, we
highlight experimental results. We conclude in section 4 by addressing promising
directions for future work.
2 Methodology
In this section, we describe a brief theoretical formulation of GP-WGAN followed
by well known attacks from the DDoS taxonomy. Subsequently, we present the
SynGAN framework and the generation of synthetic DDoS network attacks.
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Fig. 1. SynGAN framework components and operational flows.
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2.1 Gradient Penalty Wasserstein GAN (GP-WGAN)
The GAN [11] framework describes a competitive game between two neural
networks in which the generator network must compete against an adversary ac-
cording to a game theoretic scenario [4]. The generator produces samples from a
noise distribution, and its adversary, the discriminator, tries to distinguish real
samples from the generated samples. The real samples are inherited from the
training data and the generated samples from the generator. The Wasserstein
GAN (WGAN) [12] facilitates the convergence of GANs’ training using the op-
timal transport metric. The WGAN is further optimized by using a Gradient
Penalty (GP-WGAN) method allowing the generation of adversarial samples
of higher quality [6]. With Wasserstein distance and the gradient penalty, the
generator and the discriminator are able to improve at the same pace, avoiding
mode-collapse a characteristic leading to unoptimized neural network weights
which results in poor training. The GP-WGAN objective loss function is ex-
pressed such that
L = E
X˜∼PG
[f(X˜)]− E
X∼PX
[f(X)] + λ E
X̂∼P
X̂
[(||∇X̂f(X̂)||2 − 1)2] (1)
where f is the set of 1-Lipschitz functions on (X , d), PX the original data
distribution, PG the generative model distribution implicitly defined by X˜ =
G(Z), Z ∼ p(Z). The input Z to the generator is sampled from a noise distri-
bution such as a uniform distribution. PX̂ defines the uniform sampling along
straight lines between pairs of points sampled from the data distribution PX and
the generative distribution PG. A penalty on the gradient norm is enforced for
random samples X̂ ∼ PX̂ .
2.2 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
A DDoS attack occurs when multiple machines flood a network host with traffic
until the host cannot respond, or crashes, preventing access to users [13]. These
attacks exploit protocols at the network, transport and/or applications layers.
The well known attacks in the DDoS taxonomy include Teardrop, Smurf, UDP
Flooding, SYN Flooding, NTP Flooding, DNS Amplification, and application
layer HTTP attacks such as GoldenEye and Slowloris [13]. In this work, we
concentrate on generating synthetic network traffic for Smurf and GoldenEye
attacks. In a Smurf attack, an attacker relies on a large collection of Internet
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo request packets using a victim’s spoofed
source IP address that are broadcast in a network. In a GoldenEye attack, an
attacker targets web servers by keeping connections open with HTTP requests
rendering the server unable to process any other requests. The GoldenEye at-
tack and other similar application layer DDoS are deemed to be particularly
intractable because of their inherent distributed nature.
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2.3 SynGAN Framework and DDoS
The SynGAN framework generates synthetic network attack packets using real-
world attack traffic mutations. It relies on the GP-WGAN formulation to ensure
a better convergence of the error minimization function. As illustrated in figure
1, the SynGAN framework has three components: the Generator, the Discrimi-
nator and the Evaluator. Initially, during the GAN’s training, a uniform random
distribution is used to initialize the artificial samples. Then, the generative net-
work mutates the artificial samples, trying to make the latter similar to real
attacks. Subsequently, the synthetic attacks are sent to the discriminator. The
discriminator tries to differentiate between real and artificial attacks. It provides
feedback to the generative network to recursively improve the quality of the gen-
erated adversarial samples. At the end of the GAN’s training, only the generator
is used to generate artificial DDoS attacks. Finally, the gradient boosting classi-
fier, the evaluator, attempts to differentiate between between real and generated
attack packets using the quality benchmark based on the root mean square error.
We chose to use the gradient boosting algorithm as it allows an easy identifica-
tion of the relevant features used for the traffic classification, as shown in figure 2.
For our first attack generation implementation and analysis, we compare and
evaluate the NSL-KDD and CICIDS2017 datasets. The NSL-KDD dataset con-
tains two classes of network attacks, DoS and Probe, and two classes of host-
based attacks, Remote-2-Local (R2L) and User-2-Root (U2R). We first start our
approach on the DDoS attacks subset including the simple Smurf attack with 41
network flow features [8]. The CICIDS2017 dataset contains various attacks such
as infiltration, heart-bleed and GoldenEye with 80 network flow features [9]. We
then concentrate our synthetic attack experiments on the more complex Gold-
enEye attack pattern.
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Fig. 2. From left to right. (a) Gradient boosting evaluator relevant features to detect
NSL-KDD smurf attacks and (b) to detect CICIDS2017 GoldenEye attacks.
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3 Experiments
The Keras [14] library is used for the neural network implementation. The GP-
WGAN has 5 layers with 256, 128, 128, 128 and 78 neurons, and a ReLU activa-
tion function for each of the layers. Additionally, we used the RMSProp gradient
descent for the neural network training [15] with the parameters lr = 0.001, ρ =
0.9,  = 10−6. We empirically obtained the lowest error reconstruction with the
gradient penalty λ = 10. The simulations were performed on a computer with
16GB of RAM, Intel i7 CPU and a Tesla K80 GPU accelerator [16].
Results and Discussions From the Smurf attack analysis of the NSL-KDD
dataset, the top-15 aggregate parameters identified by the gradient boost eval-
uator are shown in figure 2. The highest weighted parameter, Dst host count,
represents the number of connections having the same destination host IP ad-
dress [8]. The NSL-KDD dataset, however, contains only 2,000 Smurf attacks
resulting in weak statistical relevance, thus rendering our packet generation un-
reliable. We concentrated, therefore, on the CICIDS2017 dataset that has in
excess of 10,000 DDoS attack samples including the GoldenEye attack. The
SynGAN framework is able to generate adversarial attacks with a root mean
square error of 0.10 implying very close similarity between the artificially gener-
ated attacks and original attacks. In figure 3, the graphs describing the packet
length mean, the flow bytes per sec., the flow duration and the forward Inter
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Fig. 3. From left to right. (a) Packet Length Mean, (b) Flow Bytes per sec. (c) Flow
duration and (d) Forward Inter Arrival Time (IAT) distributions between the generated
and the original attacks using SynGAN.
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Arrival Time (IAT) distributions between the generated and the original attacks
confirm close similarity. The other features share the same distribution pattern.
We computed the Area under the Curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating Char-
acteristic (ROC) curve of the gradient boosting classifier, the evaluator, between
the generated and the true attacks. The preliminary AUC score is at 75% in our
experiments, highlighting that the evaluator is partly incapable to differenti-
ate between the two types of attacks. These results reaffirm the ability of the
SynGAN framework to generate adversarial attacks of high quality.
4 Conclusion
We introduced the SynGAN framework to generate synthetic network attacks
using real attack traffic data. We evaluated the NSL-KDD and CICIDS2017
datasets for a subset of DDoS network attacks. The recent CICIDS2017 dataset
has statistically more significant samples for DDoS attacks. The framework was
applied to generate GoldenEye attack data showing more than adequate conver-
gence of real and synthetic data. Although the current framework only generates
DDoS network attacks using GP-WGANs, it shows promising results. Our future
work will explore generating models having more complex state machines [17] to
orchestrate different network attack types. The final goal is to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of commercial NIDS by generating high-quality synthetic attack traffic
of different types, and integrate the framework in a network security automation
pipeline.
References
1. Bao, T., Shoshitaishvili, Y., Wang, R., Kruegel, C., Vigna, G., Brumley, D.: How
shall we play a game?: A game-theoretical model for cyber-warfare games. In: 2017
IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). pp. 7–21. IEEE
(2017)
2. Ficke, E., Schweitzer, K.M., Bateman, R.M., Xu, S.: Characterizing the effective-
ness of network-based intrusion detection systems. In: MILCOM 2018-2018 IEEE
Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). pp. 76–81. IEEE (2018)
3. Sommer, R., Paxson, V.: Outside the closed world: On using machine learning for
network intrusion detection
4. Goodfellow, I., Bengio, Y., Courville, A., Bengio, Y.: Deep learning, vol. 1. MIT
press Cambridge (2016)
5. Yin, C., Zhu, Y., Fei, J., He, X.: A deep learning approach for intrusion detection
using recurrent neural networks. Ieee Access 5, 21954–21961 (2017)
6. Gulrajani, I., Ahmed, F., Arjovsky, M., Dumoulin, V., Courville, A.C.: Improved
training of wasserstein gans. In: Advances in Neural Information Processing Sys-
tems. pp. 5767–5777 (2017)
7. Ring, M., Schlo¨r, D., Landes, D., Hotho, A.: Flow-based network traffic generation
using generative adversarial networks. Computers & Security 82, 156–172 (2019)
8. Tavallaee, M., Bagheri, E., Lu, W., Ghorbani, A.A.: A detailed analysis of the
kdd cup 99 data set. In: 2009 IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence for
Security and Defense Applications. pp. 1–6. IEEE (2009)
SynGAN: Towards Generating Synthetic Network Attacks using GANs 7
9. Sharafaldin, I., Lashkari, A.H., Ghorbani, A.A.: Toward generating a new intrusion
detection dataset and intrusion traffic characterization. In: ICISSP. pp. 108–116
(2018)
10. McHugh, J.: Testing intrusion detection systems: a critique of the 1998 and 1999
darpa intrusion detection system evaluations as performed by lincoln laboratory.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC) 3(4), 262–294
(2000)
11. Goodfellow, I., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B., Warde-Farley, D., Ozair,
S., Courville, A., Bengio, Y.: Generative adversarial nets. In: Advances in neural
information processing systems. pp. 2672–2680 (2014)
12. Arjovsky, M., Chintala, S., Bottou, L.: Wasserstein generative adversarial networks.
In: International Conference on Machine Learning. pp. 214–223 (2017)
13. Douligeris, C., Mitrokotsa, A.: DDoS attacks and defense mechanisms: classifica-
tion and state-of-the-art. Computer Networks 44(5), 643–666 (2004)
14. Chollet, F., et al.: Keras. https://github.com/keras-team/keras (2015)
15. Hinton, G., Srivastava, N., Swersky, K.: Rmsprop: Divide the gradient by a running
average of its recent magnitude. Neural networks for machine learning, Coursera
lecture 6e (2012)
16. Charlier, J., et al.: SynGAN. https://github.com/dagrate/syngan (2019)
17. Yu, L., Zhang, W., Wang, J., Yu, Y.: Seqgan: Sequence generative adversarial nets
with policy gradient. In: Thirty-First AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(2017)
